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Parnon: RICO Damages: Look to the Clayton Act, Not the Predicate Act

RICO Damages: Look to the Clayton Act, Not the
Predicate Act
FREDERIC W. PARNON*
INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of RICO in 1970,1 almost no attention has
been paid to civil RICO damages 2 by the courts, 3 Congress, 4 or
commentatorsA
The author who has previously given the most consideration to
the problem 6 urges that RICO damages be measured by looking to
the underlying predicate acts and utilizing the most analogous civil
measure of damages. 7 Thus, "[i]n the case in which the defendant
bank allegedly falsified interest calculations to plaintiffs detriment,
* Associate, Barrett, Smith, Schapiro, Simon & Armstrong; A.B., Princeton University, 1975; J.D., Yale University, 1978; Law Clerk to the Honorable George C. Pratt,
United States District Judge (E.D.N.Y.) (now United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit). The author is indebted to David Simon, Elaine Herald, John Sullivan, Chuck
Gerber, David Frankel, Eric Schneiderman, and Joan Farrell for help in the writing of
this Article.
1. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968 (1982). In this Article, familiarity with the basic structure and terminology of
RICO is assumed. All references are to the statute before its amendment in October,
1984.
2. However, other civil RICO issues have received extensive coverage. See bibliography in this Symposium.
3. See Gorelick, The Measure of Damagesof RICO Actions, in "RICO: The Second Stage" (ABA ed. Oct. 1984) (Gorelick) ("There are no reported cases discussing
the measure of damages in RICO actions"). Most of the courts handling civil RICO
cases are federal. However, state courts are also being brought into the act. See Ebnan
Antique Rugs and Tapestries, Inc. v. N.Y. Marine Managers, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3,
1985, at 4, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Simpson Electric Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc.,
N.Y.L.J. Dec. 20, 1984, p. 16, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Greenview Trading Co. Inc.
v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 123 Misc.2d 152, 473 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1984).
4. For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of civil RICO, see Blakey,
The RICO Civil FederalAction in Context. Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME LAW 237, 249-80 (1983). No mention is made of how to measure RICO damages in the legislative history.
5. As shown by the bibilography included in this symposium, there are now literally hundreds of papers discussing RICO. To the author's knowledge, however, only
Gorelick, supra note 2 addresses the problem, and even then only briefly, following an
extensive discussion of "racketeering enterprise injury." Gorelick has also written a
chapter on measuring RICO damages in a new book, "Civil RICO Developments:
1984" put out by the editors of the RICO Litigation Reporter. The book was not published at the time this article went to press; however Gorelick in a phone conversation
with the author described the new chapter as an expansion of the position taken in her
previous paper, see supra note 3.
6. See infra note 48.
7. Gorelick, supra notes 3 and 5.
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the appropriate measure of damages might be the contractual measure." By the same reasoning, in a case involving "the victim[s] of
theft at the hands of a corrupt cleaning service[;] [t]heir remedy
resembles a tort remedy." 8 Under this "predicate act method", the
measure of damages in each RICO case would vary with the predicate acts alleged and proven.9
The alternative proposed in this Article is that RICO damages be
measured instead by a narrower standard based on Section Four of
the Clayton Act. 10 This standard would exclude damages based on
contractual "expectation interests", damages for personal injuries,
and damages based on restitution or disgorgement, as well as other
types of damages." However, it would provide an established
and
2
uniform federal measure of damages for all RICO cases.'
The superiority of a Clayton Act standard over a predicate act
method is obvious if it is assumed that a "racketeering enterprise
injury" requirement, already imposed by many courts at the pleading stage, 13 is applicable at the damages stage.' 4 Such a requirement would restrict a plaintiff to damages caused by a distinct
"racketeering enterprise injury."' 5 By precluding recovery of any
8. See infra note 48 for Gorelick's complete discussions from which these quotes
are taken.
9. Id.
10. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) provides:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States ... without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
11. See infra note 37. Generally, an antitrust claimant may recover the following
three types of damages: (1) increased costs, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); (2) lost past profits, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971); and (3) reduction in the value of his business, Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
12. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
13. There is now a split in the circuits as to the application of this requirement at
the pleading stage. Compare Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc., 741 F.2d 482
(2d Cir. 1984) cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-648) with
Haroco Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. granted,53 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-822). This split will
presumably now be resolved by the Supreme Court which has granted certiorari in
Sedima and Haroco.
14. The pleading rule would not necessarily be carried over to the damages stage.
There was some discussion of this question at a recent seminar in New York City,
reported in I RICO Litigation Reporter No. 3 at 399-400 (Nov. 1984). Irving B. Nathan of Arnold & Porter argued that any pleading requirement of racketeering enterprise injury should not be carried over to the stage of damages, and that all damages,
including those caused by the predicate acts alone, should be trebled under RICO. Ira
Lee Sorkin, Regional Administrator of the SEC in New York, disagreed, arguing that
only damages flowing from a distinct RICO injury should be trebled under RICO,
while damages caused solely by the predicate acts should be excluded.
15. However, determining the definition of a "racketeering enterprise injury" has
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damages caused by the predicate acts, this requirement would also
preclude any argument that RICO damages should be measured by
16
a predicate act standard.
However, as shown below, even if a "racketeering enterprise injury" requirement is not imposed, a Clayton Act standard would be
superior to a predicate act measure. 17 This is because a Clayton
Act standard would adhere to the language, structure, and purpose
of RICO while providing a uniform federal damage measure in all
RICO cases.' 8 In contrast, a predicate act method would not comport with the statute and would not only be unworkable but
unfair. 19
I.

THE CASE FOR A CLAYTON ACT MEASURE OF DAMAGES

A.

Congress Intended a Clayton Act Measure to Apply in Civil
RICO Cases
The sparse legislative history of the RICO statute suggests that
Congress intended a Clayton Act measure of damages to apply in
20
civil RICO cases.
The civil RICO damages remedy is provided by subsection
1964(c), which allows treble damages to "any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962. ....
,,21 The quoted language is closely modeled after Section
4 of the Clayton Act,2 2 which, in pertinent part, provides for treble
damages to "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws .... -23 By modeling RICO's damage section on the Clayton
Act's damage section, Congress expressed its intention that the
Clayton Act measure apply in civil RICO cases. 24
caused problems. See, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.

1984).
16. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
18. Blakey & Gettings, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1040

(1980)
19.
20.
21.

[hereinafter cited as Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts).
See infra notes 64-94 and accompanying text.
Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 18, at 1040.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides:
(c)Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
22. See Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 18, at 1040. See also Bennett

v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Section 1964(c) provides a private cause

of action modeled on the antitrust laws").
23. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
24. "Given the similarity of language and circumstances between the antitrust provisions and those of [RICO], there is no reason to believe that many of these antitrust
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The limited discussion and testimony in the legislative history 2s
supports this conclusion. The chief discussion in the legislative history of § 1964(c) is by Representative Poff, a sponsor of RICO in
the House, who described § 1964(c) as "another example of the antitrust
remedy being adopted for use against organized criminality."' 26 The private treble damages remedy was inserted by the
House into the final bill based on a report of the American Bar
Association, which urged adoption of a RICO treble damage remedy patterned on antitrust remedies such as section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 27 The testimony of then A.B.A. president, Edward L. Wright,
before the House emphasized the close connection between
§ 1964(c) and the Clayton Act: "[W]e would recommend an
amendment to include the additional civil remedy of authorizing
private damage suits based upon the concept of Section 4 of the
Clayton Act."' 28 This has been described as "the absolutely critical

testimony leading to the inclusion of section 1964(c) in the House
version of the bill. ....,,29 It certainly provides additional support
30
for a Clayton Act measure of damages.
B.

Application of a Clayton Act Measure Would Be Workable

and Fair
Application of a Clayton Act measure of damages in civil RICO
principles and policies would [not] be applicable to both [antitrust and RICO] types of
cases." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495 n.40 (citation omitted). For the same reasoning applied to a different problem of RICO statutory construction, see Sedima, 741 F.2d at
495 ("By borrowing language [from the Clayton Act] imposing a standing limitation, it
is reasonable to believe that Congress indicated a desire to have an analogous standing
limitation imposed in RICO").
25. The civil treble damage remedy was inserted into the bill that became RICO by
the House of Representatives only after the bill had already passed the Senate, as explained in detail by Judge Oakes in Sedima, 741 F.2d at 543-544. There is thus little in
the legislative history relating to the RICO treble damages remedy.
26. 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 35,295 (1970).
27. See Report of the A.B.A. submitted to Congress, Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary Hearings on § 30, and Related Proposals, Relating to "The
Control of Organized Crime in the United States, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 147-149 (1970).
28. Id. at 543-44.
29. This is not to say that RICO and the Clayton Act have identical purposes or
that they should be construed together in all respects. As Judge Pratt noted in one of
the recent Second Circuit cases:
"These concepts that were borrowed from the Clayton Act, treble damages
and injunctive relief, pertain to remedies rather than what is necessary to establish a claim under RICO." Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d. 524, 531 (2d. Cir.
1984).
Thus, while the remedies section of the Clayton Act and RICO should be treated together, other sections should not be. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir.
1982) aff'd en banc 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied sub. nom. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Bennett, 104 S.Ct. 527 (1983). (RICO should not "be viewed as an extension of anti-trust law in all respects. Different policies underlie the two bodies of law").
30. Id.
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cases would require a factfinder to calculate injury to plaintiff's
"business" or "property" 31 caused by defendant's RICO
32
violations.
The key terms, "business" and "property," have been defined in
Clayton Act cases rather broadly. 33 Business "encompasses practically all industrial and commercial enterprises, including those of
nonprofit plaintiffs and labor unions," while property is used in its
"naturally broad and inclusive meaning."' 34 Because "business"
and "property" have been construed so broadly, a Clayton Act
measure of damages would be flexible enough to fit various fact
35
patterns.
However, as mentioned above, a Clayton Act measure would exclude some forms of damage. 36 It would not measure damages by
the contractual standard, which includes damages based on "expectation interests."' 37 It would exclude damages for physical and psychological injuries to the person. 38 It would also presumably
prevent restitutionary or disgorgement awards from being included
31. See supra notes 21 and 23.
32. See supra note 11.
33. See Blakey & Gettings, Basic Concepts, supra note 18, at 1041 (footnotes
omitted):
[t]he courts have interpreted "business" in its ordinary sense. It encompasses
practically all industrial and commercial enterprises, including those of nonprofit plaintiffs and labor unions. The second term, "property," has also been
held to have a "naturally broad and inclusive meaning." It is wider in scope
and more extensive than the word "business." Property includes, for example,
expenditures to defend against patent infringement suits and a labor union's
opportunity to obtain members. The interest of the taxpayer or citizen, however, is not considered business or property. Moreover, personal injuries and
loss of consortium are not injuries to property under Section 4.
34. Id.
35. Id. n.150 and n.154.
36. See supra note 11.
37. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-89 (1977).
38. As used in the Clayton Act, the phrase "business or property" has uniformly
been held to exclude damages for personal injuries. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 422 U.S.
330, 339 (1979) ("the phrase 'business or property' also retains restrictive significance.
It would, for example, exclude personal injuries suffered"). Two recent decisions have
held that psychological damages are not available under RICO. Callan v. State Chemical Manufacturing Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (RICO does not allow
damages for mental anguish, loss of self-esteem and confidence, or damaged reputation); Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., No. 83-4485, slip op. (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1984)
(granting defendant's motion to strike damage claims for mental and emotional distress
based on proximity to noxious landfill); and see Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology
of California, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982) (discussing RICO claim for emotional distress). See also Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir.
1984):
The requirement that the injury be to the plaintiff's business or property
means that the plaintiff must show a proprietary type of damage. For example, a person physically injured in a fire whose origin was arson is not given a
right to recover for his personal injuries; damage to his business or his buildings is the type of injury for which § 1964(c) permits suit.
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in figuring treble damages 39 (thus a RICO plaintiff would be allowed treble damages, but would be denied treble restitution or
disgorgement).40
Of course, not every Clayton Act damage principle would be applicable in civil RICO cases.4 1 It would be up to the courts, on a
case-by-case basis, to apply those Clayton Act damage principles
which fit the language, structure and purposes of RICO, discarding
those that do not. Courts would thus have to decide at least the
following questions:
1. Should a RICO plaintiff have to show that its damages were
caused by defendant's RICO violation, as opposed to other conduct of the defendant that was lawful? This problem of allocating losses to defendant's 42
unlawful conduct has been a major
problem in antitrust cases.
39. Restitutionary relief or disgorgement would presumably not be included in
Clayton Act treble damages, because damages under the Clayton Act are based on actual loss to plaintiff, not disgorgement of defendant's gain. See generally Von Kalinowski, 161 Business Organizations § 115.01-05 (1984) (Von Kalinowski).
40. If RICO plaintiffs had the option to choose a restitutionary or disgorgement
measure and then treble it, their monetary recoveries in some cases would increase dramatically. For example, consider the facts in the well-known case of Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). In Janigan, a corporate
insider bought stock from his shareholders for $40,000 and sold it less than two years
later for approximately $700,000. Using a restitutionary measure of damages, the court
awarded plaintiffs the full sale price of the stock realized by defendant, amounting to 17
times the purchase price paid to plaintiffs. The facts in Janigan would certainly
support a RICO claim if brought today (at least outside the federal courts in the Second
Circuit). If restitutionary measures were available to measure RICO damages, plaintiffs
would be entitled to treble their $700,000 recovery, leading to a damage award more
than fifty times the purchase price of the stock.
One recent case appears to have upheld a claim for restitutionary relief as part of
RICO treble damages, at least at the pleading stage, DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp.,
589 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1984). In DeMent, plaintiffs alleged violations of various
federal and Illinois statutes, common law torts and breaches of contract. The court
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on the RICO count, which sought
damages, subject to trebling, and that included return of all fees paid to certain directors
and consultants. The court held that such restitutionary relief could be obtained at law
and thus could be obtained under RICO's provisions for "damages." Moreover, even if
such relief were better classified as equitable restitution, the court held that it represented "a form of relief available to a private RICO plaintiff." Id. at 1382. Under a
Clayton Act measure of RICO damages, plaintiffs in DeMent could not bring this restitutionary claim as part of their request for treble damages, but only as a single-damage
federal statutory or pendent claim.
41. The A.B.A. suggested to the drafters of RICO that RICO should not be enacted as an amendment to the antitrust laws, due to antitrust restrictions on standing,
proximate cause, direct injury, etc., which were "appropriate in a purely antitrust context" but which "could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles" to RICO plaintiffs. S.2048 and S.2049, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 6994-95 (1969). See
Fricano, Civil RICO: An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 361,
361 (1983). (RICO "may provide a means of circumventing judicially imposed limitations on antitrust claims .. ")It seems clear that not all antitrust concepts should be
applied to restrict measurements of RICO damages. See supra note 13. Which antitrust
concepts should be applied and which not is best left to the courts.
42. See Falls City Industries v. Vanco Beverage, 460 U.S. 428 (1983) ("If some of
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2. Should a RICO plaintiff be required to demonstrate "but
not
for" causation, by showing that its general damages would
43
have occurred "but for" defendant's RICO violation?
3. Should a RICO plaintiff be precluded from recovering losses
that were passed on to its customers or suppliers, in the form of
price increases or otherwise?44

In short, there would still be ample work for judges and lawyers

in adapting Clayton Act damage principles to RICO cases.4 5 Incorporation of a Clayton Act measure into § 1964(c) would however
provide the rudiments of a "general damages" measure for civil

RICO cases. 46 This would provide certainty and predictability in
measuring damages, and would advance the important interests of

judicial economy, fair notice to litigants, equality of results and
achievement of settlements. 47

II.

THE CASE AGAINST A PREDICATE ACT MEASURE OF

DAMAGES

A.

Congress Did Not Intend a PredicateAct Measure to Apply in
Civil RICO Cases

In contrast to a relatively uniform Clayton Act measure of damages, a predicate act measure would calculate damages in each
RICO case by looking to the underlying predicate act or acts, and
48
utilizing the most analogous civil measure of damages.

Vanco's injury was attributable to the price discrimination, Falls City is responsible to
that extent)." (Emphasis added) See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) ("wrongful conduct
rule" limits damages to the price differential caused by defendant's wrongful conduct).
43. On causation requirements under the Clayton Act, see Von Kalinowski, supra
note 24, § 115.02(3)(b)(i).
44. See the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1982) and
Koob, Damages in Antitrust Cases in Determining and Proving Damages in Business
Litigation at 216-17 (1984) ("In actions involving the Robinson-Patman Act, the weight
of authority is that the measure of damages is not the difference between what the
plaintiff paid and the price paid by the favored buyer but rather the damage to the
plaintiff's business measured by lost profits").
45. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
46. See Dobbs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.2 at 138 (1973).
47. Id.
48. See Gorelick, supra note 3, at 14-15, whose discussion is quoted in full below:
In the case in which the defendant bank allegedly falsified interest calculations to plaintiff's detriment, the appropriate measure of damages might be the
contractual measure. Contract damages protect the expectations of the parties
and place the plaintiff where he would have been had the contract been fulfilled. . . . Similarly, the customer of the securities broker who invested in
unsuitable securities could ask to be returned to the position he would have
been in had his instructions been followed. Thus, in many section 1962(c)
cases-where the plaintiff is injured by an enterprise operated through a pattern of racketeering activity-the remedy may well look like a contractual
one.
But there will be other section 1962(c) plaintiffs who have no "contract"
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There is no indication that Congress intended RICO damages to
49
be measured by looking to the underlying predicate act or acts.
The language of section 1964(c) makes no reference to predicate

acts, and there is no indication in the legislative history that damages in civil RICO cases should be measured by analogy to the
predicate acts.
Furthermore, the structure of RICO does not easily embrace a
predicate act measure of damages.50 Section 1961 of RICO defmes
the operative terms of the statute, including "predicate acts" and
the term "pattern of racketeering activity." 51 Section 1962, in four
with the defendant, e.g., the victim of theft at the hands of a corrupt cleaning
service. Their remedy resembles a tort remedy. Tort damages compensate the
victim for the consequences of the perpetrator's act, here the value of the
jewelery. [Presumably referring to the facts in Gitterman v. Vitoulis, a case
litigated by the author].
Sections 1962(a) and (b) complaints alleging that the predicate acts have
allowed the defendant to take over an enterprise are really attempts to rectify
perversions in our market or economic system. Each is likely to be unique,
requiring damages modeled on tort, contract and antitrust. For example, if
company A bribes an employee of company B to rig bids, and the profits from
this bid-rigging allow company A to underbid company B on the unrigged
competitive jobs, what is the measure of damages? As in antitrust, one must
look at the nature of the injury. There are lost profits on the rigged jobs,
lower profits on the unrigged jobs, lessened market share, damages to business
reputation and goodwill, and theft of services. The damages must be broken
down to their constituent parts according to the nature of the injury.
49. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
50. As Professor Blakey pointed out to this author in conversation, the Supreme
Court has itself relied on the structure of RICO as a guide to proper construction of the
statute. See Russello v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300 (1983). ("We are fortified in
this by our examination of the structure of the RICO statute.")
51. 18 U.S.C. section 1961 (1) reads as follows:
As used in this chapter (1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is
indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code
Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to
theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 984 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds),
section 891-84 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to
obstruction ofjustice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
extortion 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955
(relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and
2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 23412346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), section 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (c) any act which is indictable under title 29, United
States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to
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subsections, establishes four possible RICO violations, defined in
terms of relations
between "patterns of racketeering activity" and
"enterprises. ' 52 Section 1963 establishes criminal penalties for violations of section 1962, 53 and section 1964 establishes civil remedies
labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union
funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title
11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation,
receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
52. 18 U.S.C. Section 1962: Provide for the following prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest directly or indirectly any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating
in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer are held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in
any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after
such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any on class, and does not confer, either in law or in fact, the
power to elicit one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c)It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provision of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
53. 18 U.S.C. Section 1963:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of,
claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source
of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violatoin of section
1962.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including, but
not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this section,
as it shall deem proper.
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall
deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the United States, it shall expire, and shall not revert to
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for violations of section 1962. 54
At the remedies stage, criminal and civil, only the existence of a
section 1962 violation is required; no distinction is made between

different violations of section 1962 based on different predicate

acts.5 5 Furthermore, special remedies are provided for section 1962
violations, without reference to the underlying predicate acts. 56 On
the criminal side, the special remedies are twenty years in jail, a

$25,000 fine and forfeiture of the defendant's interests. On the private civil side, the remedy is treble damages based on injury to business or property (and perhaps also equitable relief). 57 Just as the
criminal remedies apply regardless of the underlying predicate acts,
so should the civil.5 8
the convicted person. All provisions of law relating to the dispositing of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of
forfeitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of claims
and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall
apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the respect to the disposition of property under the customs laws shall be performed
under this chapter by the Attorney General. The United States shall dispose
of all such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision
for the rights of innocent persons.
54. 18 U.S.C. Section 1964:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violation of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In
any action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall
proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof.
Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any
criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense
in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
55. See supra note 52.
56. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494, ("RICO was intended not simply to provide additional remedies for already compensable injuries, but rather to provide added remedies
and procedures to fight certain specific kinds of organized criminality").
57. There is controversy about the availability of equitable relief to a private civil
RICO plaintiff. See Best, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct:
Hardly a Civil Statute, in RICO: Expanding Uses in Civil Litigation, 11-12 (1984).
58. Id.
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Moreover, a predicate act measure of damages would call into
play policies in conflict with those behind RICO. The policies underlying the prohibition of white slave traffic 59 are very different
from the policies underlying the prohibition of mail fraud, 60 which
61
are different again from the policies underlying the securities laws,

all of which differ from the policies underlying RICO. 62 Application of a damage measure based on the underlying predicate acts
might advance the policies behind 63those predicate acts at the ex-

pense of the policies behind RICO.

B. Application of a PredicateAct Measure Would Be Unworkable
and Unfair
A predicate act measure of damages would attempt to find and
apply the damages measure from the state or federal civil law most
closely analogous to the predicate act or acts. However, such a

method would quickly become mired in characterizations 64and analogies that would lead to endless debate and uncertainty.
A few predicate acts are closely analogous to civil causes of action: for example, the predicate act of "fraud in the sale of securi-

ties" has been construed to be practically identical to federal

securities fraud. 65 Other predicate acts are less closely analogous to
59. Purpose "to protect women who were weak from men who were bad." Wyatt
v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530 (1960) quoting Denning v. United States, 253 F.
463, 465 (5th Cir. 1918).
60. Purpose to protect "the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil,
and to prevent the post office from being used to carry them into effect. . . ." Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896). See also United States v. Maze, 414
U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (mail fraud statute is "first line of defense" against fraudulent activity).
61. Purpose "to prevent restrictions which distort the market's estimate of value."
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied sub. nom., First Boston Corp. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 414 U.S. 910,
924 (1973).
62. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84
Stat. 922-23 (1970), contains a "Statement of Findings and Purpose" that concludes
with the following paragraph:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools and the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.
63. Id.
64. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
65. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,742 at 93,738 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Spencer Cos. v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,361, at
92,215 (D. Mass. 1981); Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware v. Bell Mtge. Corp.,
452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978). For a critical analysis see Bridges, Private RICO
Litigation Based Upon "Fraudin the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L. REv. 43, 58-63
(1983).
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civil causes of action 6 6 for example, mail and wire fraud are only
somewhat similar to common-law fraud; suits based on extortionate
credit transactions are only somewhat similar to actions for usury
or to actions challenging unfair contracts; suits based on bribery
and interference with commerce are only somewhat similar to certain federal and state antitrust claims; suits based on murder are
only somewhat similar to actions for wrongful death; suits based on
kidnapping are only somewhat similar to actions for false imprisonment. Still other predicate acts under RICO cannot be easily analogi2ed to any civil cause of action, 67 for instance, predicate acts
involving narcotics or other dangerous drugs, counterfeiting, obstruction of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations, obstruction of state or local law enforcement, interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia, or participation in white slave traffic.
Even where a RICO violation consists of multiple occurrences of
a run of the mill predicate act, courts might be hard pressed to
choose the "most analogous" general damage measure. 68 To take a
common example, where RICO claims are based on multiple acts of
mail fraud occurring in the course of a complicated business deal,
the measure of damages might come from fraud 69 as easily as from
contract.70 The problem would become more difficult if the predicate act were more exotic, and therefore less analogous to any civil
cause of action.
Of course, where the pattern of racketeering activity includes several different predicate acts, such as fraud in the sale of securities,
mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property,
or bribery and extortion, the choice of a measure of damages becomes much more difficult. 71 For example, most civil RICO cases
alleging "fraud in the sale of securities" also allege mail fraud and
wire fraud, just as securities, mail and wire fraud are normally connected in criminal prosecutions. 72 Damages resulting from these
different predicate acts cannot simply be segregated and measured
by different general rules, since the different predicate acts often
arise out of the same conduct and result in a single injury. 73 It is
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (1982).

67. Id.
68. See supra note 66.

69. Fraud damages are generally "out of pocket" damages.
70. Contract cases generally result in "benefit of the bargain" or "expectation interest" damages.

71. For example, fraud in the sale of securities, mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate
transportation of stolen property, bribery and extortion.

72. See Brickey, I Corporate Criminal Liability § 8.01 at 361 (1984) ("In a sample
of 55 criminal securities cases 30, or roughly 55%, involved charges of both securities
fraud and mail and/or wire fraud").
73. Id.
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unclear how a court could justify the choice of one measure of damages over another in these circumstances. 74
These problems would be compounded by difficult choice of law
problems. 75 As noted many years ago by McCormick, "The diversity. . . of the doctrines [of damages], and of the extent and manner of their use as between the states themselves become every year
more pronounced. ' 76 For example, in conversion cases the states
now follow three different rules on when to measure the value of the
property converted: 1) the value at the time of conversion; 2) the
highest value between the date of conversion and the date of trial;

3) the highest value between the date plaintiff had notice of the conversion and the date by which he should have replaced the missing
property. 77 The difference can, of course, be very significant-especially given the fact that RICO damages are trebled. Similar exam-

ples abound.7 8 They provide a graphic illustration of just
how
79
complex and unworkable a predicate act method would be.

Despite these serious problems with a predicate act measure, two

arguments might be advanced in its support. 80 The first argument
is that RICO ought to protect all of the interests implicated by the
underlying predicate acts. 81 Thus, if the underlying predicate act

involves interference with or breach of contract, expectation interests ought to be protected by applying (and then trebling) a con74. Id.
75. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES, Foreword at v. (1935) (McCormick).
76. Id.
77. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 5.14, at 404 (1973); see also
McCormick, supra note 75 at 465-466.
78. For example, in RICO cases based on kidnapping, the most analogous civil
measure of damages might be that for false arrest. In false arrest cases, most but not all
states include in damages all expenses incurred by a plaintiff after release on bail in
defense of the underlying proceedings. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES, § 107, at 377 (1935).
The difference between the majority and minority positions, again could be very significant, especially after trebling, making too much depend on the outcome of the choiceof-law problem.
79. For an inkling of the difficulties that would arise, consider the continuing confusion surrounding the statute of limitations governing civil RICO claims, where the
rule has been to look to the "most analogous" state law statute of limitations. After
years of litigation, courts continue to disagree about what statute of limitation applies in
RICO cases. See Best, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act:
Hardly a Civil Statute, in RICO: Expanding Uses in Civil Litigation 58 (1984)
("Adopting state limitation laws is a source of potential confusion since different limitation periods would apply to the same RICO offenses in different states. Indeed, even
one state might have several potentially applicable limitations statutes. Complex choice
of law problems may obviously arise when interstate racketeering acts are involved.
Because of the complexity and uncertainty in this area a civil RICO suit should be filed
as soon as an investigation discloses sufficient facts to allege the elements of the
offense").
80. See also, Gorelick, supra notes 3, 5 and 48.
81. Id.
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tract-type measure of damages.8 2 If instead the predicate act inflicts
personal injuries, those interests ought to be protected by awarding
83
(and then trebling) personal injury damages.
However, this argument ignores the fact that Congress imposed a
requirement of injury to "business or property. '84 Congress
thereby expressed the intention to exclude some forms of damages, 85 and indicated that other interests were not paramount. 86
Civil RICO plaintiffs certainly have the option of asserting pendent
claims seeking tort damages to recover for personal injuries, contract damages to protect expectation interests, and fraud claims to
obtain restitution, etc. 87 Civil RICO plaintiffs also have the option
of asserting independent federal claims such as federal securities law
claims. While such claims would not qualify for trebling under
RICO, they would still be part of a plaintiff's suit. 88 The only limit
on monetary awards would be avoidance of duplicative damages.8 9
This appears to afford adequate protection to the interests implicated by the predicate acts, without doing violence to the statutory
restriction of damages to those involving plaintiff's "business or
property."
The second argument that might be advanced in favor of a predicate act measure is that the strongest possible weapons should be
available to a RICO plaintiff, since RICO damages are only available against defendants proved to have committed a pattern of racketeering activity. 90 This argument, however, is weak at best. There
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

85. For example, damages for personal injuries are excluded. See supra note 38.
86. For example, consider the contractual expectation interests of businessmen.
See supra note 37.
87. Civil RICO plaintiffs may also apply to the government for restitution of prop.
erty forfeited by the convicted RICO defendant. The award of such restitution is within
the unreviewable discretion of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General.
88. The plaintiff could bring such claims in a federal court, even without RICO
claims.
89. For example, consider the facts of Janigan v. Taylor, supra note 40 and accompanying text. If Janigan were brought today under RICO, damages could be awarded
for three times the difference between the value of plaintiffs stock at the time of sale
($40,000 plus X) and the price paid by the defendant ($40,000), in other words, three
times X. Restitution might then be awarded on top of this, pursuant to a federal securities or state law pendent claim, requiring defendant to disgorge the ultimate sale price of
the stock ($700,000), minus its value at the time defendant bought the stock from plaintiff ($40,000 plus X). This would provide both RICO treble damages and restitution,
while avoiding duplication of damages. Cf Alcorn County v. United States Interstate
Supplied, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1170 n.16 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing duplication of damages in the context of punitive and treble damages).
90. Cf. Blakey, Reflections, supra note 4, at 237, 290 n.150 (1983) ("if [RICO's]
language is ambiguous, that construction which would 'effectuate its remedial purpose'
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies' ought to be adopted (citation
omitted)").
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must be some limits on RICO damages, in recognition of established damage principles concerned with the avoidance of windfalls
to plaintiffs, establishment of proper incentives to plaintiffs and defendants to settle, and avoidance of economic waste. 9 1 Surely,
RICO plaintiffs cannot be allowed simply to choose the method of
measuring damages that results in the largest award, and then treble
it. Such a method would be completely uncertain and unpredictable, 92 and would sacrifice too many established principles of damage law to the single goal of deterring RICO violators.
CONCLUSION

A predicate act method would encourage RICO plaintiffs to advance every possible analogy and characterization in search of the
most lucrative measure of damages. 93 It would thus lead to abusive
RICO damage theories, similar to the abusive RICO liability94 theories that have plagued the courts for the past several years.
In contrast, a Clayton Act method would make the measurement
of RICO damages relatively simple and predictable. 95 It would provide treble damages where they most clearly further the purposes of
RICO, while still allowing recovery of single damages via pendent
claims to enforce other policies embodied in other laws. 96 It would
also prevent RICO from being used as a launching pad for overly
"creative" damage theories, alleged by plaintiffs seeking recoveries
far beyond their injuries and far beyond anything available under
pre-existing law.
A Clayton Act method should thus be welcomed by the many
judges who have decried the tide of abusive civil RICO suits and
cast about for some way to bring those suit into line with pre-existing law. 97 It should also be welcomed by businessmen who, if

91. See Dobbs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.2 at 145-46 (1973).
92. Moreover, it would result in forum shopping.
93. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
96. However, it should be noted that under any measure of damages, some RICO
violations might not give rise to pendent claims or civil RICO treble damage claims.
Consider a defendant who engages in a pattern of racketeering activity by selling narcotics to high school students. The students (or their parents) probably could not show
injury to their business or property as required for a RICO treble damage claim. It is
also unclear whether state law would provide a damage remedy. If RICO is held to
provide equitable relief to private plaintiffs, injunctive relief might be available. Otherwise, this type of case would be relegated to criminal prosecutors, not civil plaintiffs.
97. See generallySedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F2d 482 (2d. Cir. 1984)
and cases cited therein.
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they must be subjected to civil RICO "prosecution," are best served
by a civil RICO damages measure that adheres to the language,
structure and purpose of the statute.
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